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PROTECT AMERICA BY BEING 
UNIQUE: HOW CHANGES IN 
BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION 
PROCEDURES CAN IMPROVE US-VISIT 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has 
used biometric data technology to identify virtually all foreign citizens 
entering the United States.1 United States Visitor and Immigrant Sta-
tus Indicator Technology,2 commonly referred to as “US-VISIT,” 
utilizes fingerprint scanning and facial photographs to confirm the 
identities of foreign visitors between the ages of 14 and 79.3 Demon-
strating the magnitude of the program, US-VISIT identifies about 
30,000 individuals for the U.S. Department of State and 100,000 indi-
viduals for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) each day.4 
As this note will discuss, US-VISIT has achieved considerable 
success in using biometric identification technology to meet U.S. se-
curity objectives,5 but falls short of its full potential.6 While DHS has 
  
 1 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1044T, HOMELAND 
SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR BIOMETRIC US-VISIT EXIT CAPABILITY REMAIN UNCLEAR 
4 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES IS COLLECTING 10 
FINGERPRINTS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS AT MAJOR U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY 1 
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10-
fingerprint_consumer_friendly_content_250_words.pdf. 
 2 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT, BIOMETRICS AND YOU 1 
(2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_traveler_ 
brochure_printer_friendly_english.pdf [hereinafter BIOMETRICS AND YOU] (describing 
the US-VISIT procedure and providing information about its applicability). 
 3 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT 
PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AT AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS1 (2008), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_airsea_biometric_ 
Exit_Update.pdf [hereinafter CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT PROCEDURES]. 
 4 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH 
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 5 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary 
/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_biometrics_brochure_english.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCING 
SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION]. 
 5 See id. at 2 (providing specific examples of the use of biometric data to 
uncover true identity and criminal history of travelers through U.S. ports of entry). 
 6 See e.g., DIEM NGUYEN & JENA BAKER MCNEILL, HERITAGE FOUND., 
BIOMETRIC EXIT PROGRAM SHOWS NEED FOR NEW STRATEGY TO REDUCE VISA 
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implemented effective procedures to capture the biometric data of 
those entering the country, it has not yet executed a plan to collect the 
biometric data of those leaving it.7 If biometric exit-data were collect-
ed, immigration officials could instantly identify those aliens still pre-
sent in the United States in violation of the terms of their visas.8 
Realizing the benefits of collecting this information, Congress 
mandated in 2007 that DHS develop a system to collect biometric 
exit-data by June of 2009,9 but doing so has proven problematic.10 
Indeed, DHS notes that the infrastructure, land, and resources neces-
sary to construct a collection system at the country’s points of exit that 
mirror those at the points of entry are impracticable.11 According to 
the Heritage Foundation, exit collection systems could cost DHS be-
tween $3.1 billion and $6.4 billion over the next ten years.12 To put 
this cost in perspective, DHS has spent only $1.3 billion on the im-
plementation of an entry-data collection system. In light of these stag-
gering costs, some have even questioned the value of obtaining bio-
metric exit-data.13 
Yet, are there alternative solutions that would allow for the collec-
tion of exit-data without requiring DHS to absorb this unreasonable 
expense? This Note advocates for increased security cooperation with 
border countries such as Canada. In so doing, significant cost savings 
could be realized if the United States were to take advantage of the 
infrastructure already in place at the respective borders. Additionally, 
this Note reviews biometric technologies already employed at the 
borders of foreign countries that could be adopted by the United 
States to mitigate some of the impracticability cited by DHS. 
Part I of this note will examine the current implementation of bi-
ometric identification technologies used by immigration officials in 
  
OVERSTAYS (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg_ 
2358.pdf. 
 7 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3; see generally NGUYEN & 
MCNEILL, supra note 6 (providing background information about proposed exit pro-
grams). 
 8 See NGUYEN &MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 2. 
 9 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 2845, 118 stat. 3638, 3729 (2004). 
 10 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER 
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006); NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6, 
at 2-5. 
 11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY: 
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT 
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006). 
 12 NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 4. 
 13 Id. 
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the United States. Part II will identify and discuss possible programs 
with Canada that could mitigate the costs associated with the imple-
mentation of an exit-data collection system. It will also identify tech-
nological advances and future collection procedures that could im-
prove the success of the program. 
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF 
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY 
A. History of Federal Legislation Calling for Biometric Data         
Collection 
In an attempt to “strengthen and tighten the immigration law” and 
“improve border control,”14 the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in 
1996.15 IIRIRA required U.S. immigration officials to implement an 
“automated entry and exit control system” to “collect a record of de-
parture for every alien…and match the records of departure with the 
record of the alien’s arrival in the United States….”16 In response to 
this legislation, Immigration and Naturalization Services (“Legacy 
INS”)17 created the National Automated Immigration Lookout System 
(“NAILS”).18 
  
 14 Laurence M. Krutchik, Down But Not Out: A Comparison of Previous 
Attempts at Immigration Reform and the Resulting Agency Implemented Changes, 32 
NOVA L. REV. 455, 463 (2008) (quoting 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5 
(2005)). 
 15 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub.L. No. 140-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-558 (1996) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 16 Id. at §110. 
 17 Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was originally part of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and handled legal and illegal immigration and naturaliza-
tion. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress ordered the 
reorganization of federal agencies responsible for securing U.S. borders and central-
ized their management in the newly formed Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”). There are now four primary federal agencies within DHS that provide bor-
der security. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) patrols the U.S. border and con-
ducts immigrations and customs inspections. The Bureau of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (“ICE”) investigates immigrations and customs violations within 
the United States. The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) is responsible 
for the security of the country’s land, rail, and air transportation networks. The U.S. 
Coast Guard (“USCG”) continues to provide maritime and port security. See BLAS 
NUÑEZ-NETO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21899, BORDER SECURITY: KEY AGENCIES 
AND THEIR MISSIONS 1 (2005). See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [hereinafter THE 9/11 
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Legacy INS, in conjunction with the State Department and cus-
toms authorities, used NAILS to identify and screen all foreigners 
seeking entry into the United States.19 The system relied on a database 
containing biographical information for individuals which could be 
cross-referenced during visa application review procedures and at 
immigration points of entry.20 Unfortunately, foreign travelers could 
evade NAILS identity detection easily by using false names and 
fraudulent documentation.21 
After the events of September 11, 2001, Congressional leaders 
became increasingly critical of the biographical nature of the NAILS 
database because of the ease with which foreigners could bypass de-
tection.22 To address these deficiencies, the Congress passed a number 
of national security initiatives, including the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.23 Its purpose was to “attack docu-
ment fraud which aids terrorists in entering the United States.”24 A 
key component of this legislation was the requirement that the newly-
created DHS incorporate biometric identification technology into the 
immigration process and form an integrated system to track entry and 
exit-data for foreign visitors.25 
To comply with the new biometric requirement, DHS created the 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”).26 
NSEERS required foreign visitors from 23 targeted countries,27 as 
  
COMMISSION REPORT] (providing background information on the need for reorganiza-
tion). 
 18 Susan Martin & Philip Martin, International Migration and Terrorism: 
Prevention, Prosecution and Protection, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 329, 332 (2004). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. (“[NAILS] is effective only if an applicant uses a name that has been 
entered into the database; false names, supported by fraudulent documentation, can 
help an individual to evade identification….”). 
 23 See Krutchik, supra note 14, at 465 (discussing the legislative response to 
9/11). 
 24 Id. at 465-66. 
 25 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-458, § 7208(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3819 (2004) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d) 
(2006)). 
 26 See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Changes to Na-
tional Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS) (Dec. 01, 2003), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0305.shtm (providing back-
ground information regarding the creation and implementation of NSEERS by DHS). 
 27 Targeted countries included: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen. DAVID S. ORTIZ ET AL., REVISITING US-VISIT: U.S. IMMIGRATION 
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well as travelers DHS identified as “being of interest,” to submit to 
questioning and biometric registration upon entry to the United 
States.28 Questions asked during the interviews included the individu-
al’s email address, details about personal contacts and family mem-
bers, bank accounts, credit card numbers, employer addresses, and 
school addresses.29 Upon learning of the countries to be targeted, 
commentators noted that the program “patently target[ed] Muslims 
and Arabs in America.”30 
Compounding concerns of racial profiling, NSEERS also included 
a special “call-in registration” component.31 This aspect of the pro-
gram called for all travelers from 25 countries that entered the United 
States on a temporary visa to report to a DHS facility for biometric 
registration.32 International human rights groups described this retro-
active special registration as discriminatory and violations of interna-
tional law, as specific populations of immigrants were targeted includ-
ing, for example, Pakistanis, Saudi Arabians, Bangladeshis and Egyp-
tians.33 While NSEERS stirred political controversy in Congress and 
resulted in mass protests by ethnic groups and civil liberties advo-
cates,34 it resulted in the federal government’s first attempts to incor-
porate biometric information into the immigration process by requir-
ing fingerprints and photographs of those registered under the pro-
gram.  
Fingerprint identification technology analyzes the patterns of mi-
nute ridges and furrows of skin present on the fingers and toes of hu-
  
PROCESSES, CONCERNS, AND CONSEQUENCES 14 (2006), available 
athttp://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP140.pdf 
 28 ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., The Canada-U.S. Border: 
Balancing Trade, Security and Migrant Rights in the Post 9/11 Era, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 199, 230 (2004). As explained by the Department of Justice, individuals were 
selected for NSEERS registration “according to four criteria: (1) all citizens or na-
tionals of certain designated countries, (2) individual notification through a tracking 
database known as the ‘Interagency Border Inspection System’ (IBIS), (3) pre-
existing criteria defined by the Attorney General, and (4) officer discretion.” Kareem 
Shora, National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 2 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 75 (2003). 
 29 Id. at 75-76. 
 30 Id. at 74. 
 31 See id. (suggesting that certain ethnicities were unfairly targeted by the 
“call in registration” requirements of NSEERS). 
 32 ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., supra note 28, at 230. 
 33 See id. at 236-37. 
 34 See Shora, supra note 28, at 77-78 (describing, for example, a demonstra-
tion in Los Angeles that brought out 1,000 protestors in opposition to the “call-in” 
registration). 
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mans.35 It is one of the most reliable techniques available to immigra-
tion enforcement officials for one simple fact: no person has ever been 
found to possess the same pattern of ridges and furrows as another.36 
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of an individual’s fingerprints 
do not change with time.37 
While other biometric identification techniques exist, fingerprint 
technology is unique in that immigration officials already have a large 
database of records upon which they may draw.38 The United States 
Government Accountability Office notes that fingerprint technology is 
the optimal biometric identification technology because it can lever-
age existing DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) identi-
fication databases.39 The FBI has pooled and archived the fingerprint 
records from U.S. law enforcement agencies since the1920s,40 and its 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System is now the 
largest biometric database in the world, with over 400 million prints.41 
DHS later expanded NSEERS to include biometric registration of 
all foreign visitors to the United States. By expanding the program to 
all foreigners, NSEERS no longer targeted certain ethnicities or geo-
graphic regions to the behest of many human rights organizations. 
This comprehensive program developed into what is now US-
VISIT,42 which is led by a director, who reports to the Deputy Secre-
tary for Homeland Security.43 The program office is generally respon-
  
 35 See ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 2 (Henry C. Lee & R. E. 
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).  
 36 Id. at 3. 
 37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 139 (2002) (“Scientific stud-
ies in the mid-1800s established the persistence of friction ridge patterns on human 
fingers, beginning in the embryonic stage and extending throughout life, except for 
accidental damage.”). 
 38 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-361, HOMELAND 
SECURITY: STRATEGIC SOLUTION FOR US-VISIT PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE BETTER 
DEFINED, JUSTIFIED, AND COORDINATED 31 (2008) (discussing the various fingerprint 
databases upon which the US-VISIT program may draw). 
 39 Id. 
 40 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF 
FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND USES 1 (1979). 
 41 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 139 (2002). 
 42 See Martin, supra note 18, at 335 (providing background information 
about the creation of US-VISIT). 
 43 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY: 
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT 
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 12 (2006). 
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sible for the “acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of 
US-VISIT.”44 
B. The Current US-VISIT Biometric Data Collection Process 
Most foreign visitors between the ages of 14 and 79 follow US-
VISIT immigration procedures when travelling to the United States.45 
US-VISIT and the immigration process include three distinct stages: 
(1) pre-travel visa issuance where required, (2) biometric data collec-
tion upon the traveler’s entry to the United States, and (3) biographic 
data collection upon the traveler’s departure from the United States.46 
1. Pre-Travel Visa Issuance Process 
The United States does not generally require a visa for travelers 
from27 countries47 participating in its Visa Waiver Program.48 Trav-
elers from other countries, however, must obtain a visa to enter the 
country.49 A visa permits the visitor to travel to U.S. points of entry, 
such as airports, seaports and land border crossings, and request entry 
to the country.50 However, the United States maintains the right to 
refuse entry to the country even if the traveler has a visa.51 To obtain a 
visa, travelers must visit a U.S. consular office or embassy before 
  
 44 Id. 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT 
PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AT AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_airsea_biometric 
_Exit_Update.pdf. 
 46 See, e.g., BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1-3. 
 47 Participating countries include Andorra, Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San 
Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: TRAVELER GUIDE 2 n.1 
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_traveler_ 
guide_english.pdf. 
 48 Id. at 2.A visa is still required for travelers from Visa Waiver Program 
countries if the traveler “intend[s] to stay longer than 90 days, intend[s] to travel to 
the United States for a reason other than business or tourism, ha[s] ever been arrested 
even if not convicted, ha[s] a criminal record, ha[s] a serious, communicable disease 
(including HIV), ha[s] been refused entry to the United States on a previous occasion, 
ha[s] been deported from the United States, ha[s] previously overstayed the 90 days 
[on a previous trip to the United States], or [is] a child included on [a] parent’s pass-
port.”Id.  at n.2. 
 49 Id. at 2. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. (“A visa allows you to travel to the United States as far as the port 
of entry (airport, seaport or land border crossing), where the Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) officer has the authority to permit you to enter the United States.”). 
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arriving in the United States.52 There, a representative from the U.S. 
Department of State reviews the traveler’s visa application53 and col-
lects the traveler’s biometric data, including a ten-finger fingerprint 
scan and a digital photograph.54 The biometric data is then saved and 
cross-referenced with all other entries in the US-VISIT database.55 
2. Data Collection Upon Entry to the United States 
When travelling to the United States by ship or airplane, an airline 
or cruise representative provides the traveler with an entry form that 
must be completed prior to arrival.56 Travelers from countries in the 
United States’ Visa Waiver Program complete a Form I-94W, while 
travelers from other countries complete a Form I-94.57 Upon disem-
barking from the airplane or ship, a CBP officer interviews the travel-
er and reviews the requisite travel documentation as well as the I-94 
or I-94W form.58 The CBP officer scans all ten of the traveler’s fin-
gerprints using the US-VISIT’s inkless fingerprinting technology and 
takes a digital photograph of the traveler’s face.59 US-VISIT saves the 
biometric data and cross-references it against other entries in its data-
base, including the fingerprint data taken during the visa application 
interview.60 In the event that the database matches the scan to the cor-
rect visa application, the CBP officer will permit the traveler to enter 
the country.61 
Land border crossings follow modified protocols depending on 
the border location and citizenship of those seeking entry.62 At the 
  
 52 See BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1 (directing travelers to contact 
the “closest U.S. visa-issuing post”). 
 53 Id. In addition to the visa application, foreign travelers may also have to 
submit certain forms and supporting documents. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
TYPES OF VISAS FOR TEMPORARY VISITORS, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/ 
types_1286.html# (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 54 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1.  
 55 Aaron S. Miller, The 2004 European Union Members and the Visa Waiver 
Program: Considering Free Trade and National Security, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
187, 206 (2007). 
 56 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 2. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Miller, supra note 55, at 206 (describing how CBP officers cross-reference 
fingerprints in an effort to reveal possible “red flags” before the traveler enters the 
United States). 
 61 BIOMETRICS AND YOU 2, supra note 2,at 2.  
 62 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT AT THE U.S.-MEXICO 
LAND BORDER, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_us 
_mexico_land_border_info_card_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 
U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT AT THE U.S.-
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Mexico-U.S. border, all travelers who are not citizens of Mexico or 
the United States must follow the same process as travelers arriving at 
airports and seaports.63 Foreign travelers must complete a Form I-94 
as well as have their biometric data recorded per US-VISIT proto-
col.64 Mexican citizens who plan to stay in the United States more 
than thirty days or who are travelling away from the border also fol-
low these requirements.65 Mexican citizens who plan to stay less than 
thirty days and who plan to remain in the “border zone,”66 however, 
may be issued a Border Crossing Card.67 This card allows them to 
cross the border without completing a Form I-94 or having to provide 
biometric data for the US-VISIT program.68 On the other hand, at the 
Canada-U.S. border, most Canadians are exempt from the US-VISIT 
program.69 All other travelers who are not Canadian or United States 
citizens must submit to US-VISIT data collection procedures at the 
border.70 
3. Data Collection Upon Departure from the United States 
When departing from the United States by airplane or ship, travel-
ers must return their I-94 or I-94W form to the appropriate airline or 
ship representative, which completes the immigration process.71 Con-
gress mandated that DHS implement a nationwide system for collect-
ing biometric exit-data for departing travelers by 2009,72 but such a 
  
CANADA BORDER, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit 
_edu_us_canada_land_border_info_card_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) [here-
inafter U.S.-CANADA BORDER]. 
 63 U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER, supra note 62. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 DHS defines the “border zone” as any area within 25 miles of the U.S.-
Mexico border in Texas, California, and New Mexico, and within 75 miles of the 
U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., US-
VISIT Fact Sheet: U.S. Land Borders (Mar. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0371.shtm. 
 67 U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER, supra note 62.  
 68 Id. However, if the traveler uses a Border Crossing Card and the immigra-
tion official asks for a secondary inspection, that traveler becomes subject to US-
VISIT’s requirements. Id. 
 69 U.S.-CANADA BORDER, supra note 62. Canadians are subject to the US-
VISIT program, however, if they are: (1) dual-citizens and are travelling under their 
non-Canadian passport, or (2) using a U.S. treaty trader (E) or a fiancé (K) nonimmi-
grant visa. Id. 
 70 Id. (“US-VISIT currently applies to most visitors (with limited exemp-
tions) entering the United States, regardless of country of origin or whether they are 
traveling on a visa.”). 
 71 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3.  
 72 CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT PROCEDURES, supra note 3, at3. 
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process has not yet been executed.73 Creating an exit-data collection 
system is challenging because most United States “airports, railway 
stations, and border posts do not have physical space allocated for 
exit-control activities.”74 Thus, the cost and space necessary to im-
plement this kind of infrastructure makes exit-data collection imprac-
ticable in many locations.75 
Nevertheless, two biometric exit-data collection pilot programs 
were commenced in May of 2009.76 Specifically, U.S. Transportation 
Security Administration (“TSA”) officers began collecting biometric 
exit-data from non-citizens at security checkpoints at Atlanta’s 
Hartsfeld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.77 Customs and Bor-
der Protection officials performed similar procedures at Detroit’s 
Wayne County Airport.78 The intent was that these pilot programs 
would allow for the development of nationwide biometric exit-data 
collection procedures.79 As noted by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
during the testing, “[t]he pilot programs in Atlanta and Detroit will 
help [the United States to] determine and develop standard procedures 
for use at airports across the country to expedite legitimate travel and 
enhance our nation’s security.”80 During these pilot programs, TSA 
agents still collected departure Forms I-94 and I-94W.81 Following the 
pilot program, US-VISIT installed exit-data collection kiosks in thir-
teen airports and three seaports.82 The kiosks are located in a secure 
part of the airport and are monitored by U.S. immigration officials.83 
  
 73 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3. 
 74 ORTIZ, supra note 27, at 13. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Begins Test of Bio-
metric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (May 28, 2009), available 
athttp://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. CBP and TSA used different techniques for identifying which passen-
gers required biometric scanning. CBP used temporary signs at the gate directing 
visitors to collection points. TSA checked boarding passes and directed non-U.S. 
travelers to a secondary inspection zone. The pilots were designed to identify the most 
accurate protocol for exit-data collection. See U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT 
STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM, COMPREHENSIVE EXIT 
PROGRAM: AIR EXIT PILOT 4 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_air_exit.pdf 
 80 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Begins Test of Bio-
metric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (May 28, 2009), available athttp://www. 
dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm. 
 81 Id. 
 82 US-VISIT installed biometric collection kiosks at airports in Baltimore, 
Dallas, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Atlanta, Newark, 
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) notes, 
however, that one of the primary obstacles to completing an exit-data 
collection program is the additional infrastructure requirements at land 
border crossings.84 DHS estimates that implementing such a system 
would cost approximately $3 billion,85 but one policy group has esti-
mated that the cost would be somewhere between $3.1 billion and 
$6.4 billion.86 Furthermore, the implementation plans under consider-
ation by DHS would require a collection protocol that would mirror 
US-VISIT entry procedures.87 U.S. border officials would need to 
review the travel documents for each exiting traveler and compare that 
information to the traveler’s biometric identity.88 Traffic congestion in 
exit lanes would increase dramatically because of the need for each 
vehicle to stop for processing—an outcome DHS officials view as 
unacceptable.89 In some cases, an exit system that mirrors US-VISIT 
entry procedures would be unfeasible, specifically at urban border 
crossings where land constraints exist.90 While DHS has tested inter-
im procedures for tracking non-biometric exit-data, it estimated that 
the technological advancements necessary for a feasible border-exit 
implementation would not be available for another five to ten years.91 
  
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle-Tacoma, and San Juan. The seaport kiosk instal-
lations include Miami, Long Beach, and San Pedro. ORTIZ, supra note 27, at 13. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER 
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006). 
 85 Id. 
 86 NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 4.  
 87 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER 
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006). 
 88 See id. (referencing existing entry procedures, which utilize biometric 
data, as an instructive framework for exit-system proposals). 
 89 Id. 
 90 For example, the border crossing at San Ysidro, California operates 24 
staffed entry lanes, but only six unmanned exit lanes. Implementing a mirror bio-
metric exit-data collection protocol would require the construction of an additional 18 
exit lanes to manage the same level of traffic. Furthermore, all exit lanes would need 
to be staffed and equipped with fixed inspection facilities and biometric scanners 
accordingly. Id. at 39-40. 
 91 Id. at 7. See discussion infra Part II for possible solutions for collecting 
biometric exit-data. 
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C. Purposes of the US-VISIT program 
US-VISIT’s slogan, “Keeping America’s Doors Open and Our 
Nation Secure,”92 emphasizes the multi-faceted purpose of the pro-
gram. DHS has identified four principal goals for implementing a 
biometric tracking system for foreign visitors: (1) enhancing the secu-
rity of U.S. citizens and visitors; (2) expediting legitimate travel and 
trade; (3) ensuring the integrity of the U.S. immigration system; and 
(4) safeguarding the personal privacy of visitors to the United States.93 
1. Enhancing Security for U.S. Citizens and Visitors 
While immigration policies and procedures cannot prevent terror-
ist acts, “they are key ingredients of the effort to combat terrorism” 
and related U.S. national security interests.94 DHS has recently stated 
that” [b]iometrics—unique physical characteristics, such as finger-
prints, that can be used for automated recognition—form the founda-
tion of US-VISIT’s identification services because they are reliable, 
convenient and virtually impossible to forge.”95 Travelers can easily 
change names and dates of birth on travel documentation, but biomet-
rics are unique for each individual.96 Prior to US-VISIT, immigration 
officials relied primarily upon paper-based documents that were sus-
ceptible to fraud or alteration.97 Incorporating biometric data into the 
immigration process significantly increases the ability to detect fraud-
ulent and altered travel documents.98 Biometric data also allows offi-
cials to verify the identity of individuals applying for visas with a 
  
 92 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES 
SECURITY AND FACILITATES U.S. ENTRY PROCESS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS 
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10finger 
print_consumer_friendly_content_1400_words.pdf [hereinafter NEW BIOMETRIC 
TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY]. 
 93 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1. 
 94 Martin, supra note 18, at 329. 
 95 ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra note 4, 
at 3. 
 96 NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 2 
(“The United States collects biometrics because unlike names and dates of birth, 
which can be changed, biometrics are unique and almost impossible to forge.”). 
 97 ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra note 4, 
at 2. 
 98 Id. To illustrate this point, DHS provides anecdotal “success stories” 
where biometric data collection helped uncover fraudulent documents, which may not 
have been revealed prior to US-VISIT’s implementation. Id.  
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greater veracity, where before they needed to rely primarily on bio-
graphic background information.99 
The ability to digitize biometric data also allows for increased co-
operation between agencies and countries and offers inter-agency ac-
cess to vital information100 because US-VISIT provides a single 
source of biometric data for “dangerous people.”101 Examples of col-
laboration through US-VISIT are numerous. The Department of State 
uses US-VISIT to gather the identities of visa applicants at consulates 
and embassies.102 CBP collects biometric data at United States points 
of entry and uses that information to confirm the identity of travelers 
attempting to enter the United States.103 CBP also uses US-VISIT to 
track the identities of those illegal immigrants apprehended at the bor-
der.104 Citizenship & Immigration Services uses US-VISIT to verify 
the identity of those applying for immigration benefits like asylum 
and refugee status.105 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
uses US-VISIT’s database to track individuals who have overstayed 
the time limit on their visas.106 The U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) iden-
tifies individuals apprehended during illegal migrant interdiction mis-
sions with US-VISIT.107 The Department of Defense and the Intelli-
gence Community are able to identify terror suspects by cross-
referencing biometric information collected at known terrorist safe-
houses or training camps with information in the US-VISIT data-
base.108 The Department of Justice, through the FBI, uses US-VISIT 
to assist state and local law enforcement officers during investiga-
tions.109 Indeed, US-VISIT possesses a dedicated Biometric Support 
Center that provides forensic analysis and identification assistance for 
federal, state, and local agency investigations twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week.110 US-VISIT allows for unprecedented collabora-
  
 99 Id. (noting that the near-impossibility of forging biometric data increases 
its veracity). 
 100 Id. (explaining that after US-VISIT there is “[b]etter coordination with 
other agencies; [because there is] a single source for biometrics-based information on 
dangerous people” and on a global scale, “[c]ountries are adopting similar standards 
to stop criminals, immigration violators and known or suspected terrorists”). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 4. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
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tion by centralizing the location of the data collected by each of these 
individual agencies.111 
Although the program is relatively new, DHS already has adver-
tised success stories demonstrating US-VISIT’s ability to increase 
security. For example, when a foreign national arrived at New York’s 
John F. Kennedy International Airport, all of his immigration and visa 
documentation appeared to be in order.112 On paper, he had no history 
of criminal or immigration violations. When U.S. immigration offi-
cials scanned the man’s fingerprints, however, they discovered that 
the visa documentation was for the man’s twin brother. The man at 
the airport had previously been arrested for illegally taking photo-
graphs of a U.S. military base and thus, CBP officials refused entry.113 
In another case, a foreign national applied for U.S. asylum using 
an alias and an incorrect date of birth to disguise his identity.114 After 
immigration officials referenced his fingerprints with the US-VISIT 
database, “his biometrics revealed an extensive criminal record, in-
cluding charges for rape, assault, and an outstanding warrant for kid-
napping.”115 Immigration officials alerted law enforcement, who ar-
rested the man.116 
In an example of international cooperation, a man was detained in 
the United Kingdom after attempting to apply for asylum illegally.117 
When the man applied for asylum, the United Kingdom cross-
referenced his fingerprints with the US-VISIT database, and discov-
ered that the man had previously traveled to the United States under a 
false name, and was attempting to hide his true identity in his asylum 
application. The United Kingdom learned that the man was wanted on 
rape charges in Australia and promptly deported him to face criminal 
proceedings in that country.118 
The most compelling demonstration of US-VISIT effectiveness, 
however, may be the USCG’s use of the biometric data technology in 
the seas around the Caribbean.119 During one illegal migrant interdic-
tion mission, the USCG detained ten illegal migrants attempting to 
  
 111 Id. Because close allies to the United States are also implementing similar 
programs with like standards, immigration officials have access to biometric data 
across the globe. This allows for identification of potentially “dangerous people” 
through international collaboration. Id. 
 112 Id. at 2. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 5. 
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enter Puerto Rico by sea. After tracking the identities of the individu-
als through the US-VISIT database, USCG discovered that two of the 
individuals had illegally entered the United States on a prior occasion, 
and were believed to be part of a human trafficking criminal enter-
prise. The USCG detained the two and brought them ashore for prose-
cution. USCG reports that since its implementation of biometric col-
lection procedures in accordance with the US-VISIT program, “prose-
cutions of repeat offenders have increased dramatically and illegal 
migration has dropped by 75 percent in the area where the [US-
VISIT] technology is being used.”120 
Statistics also suggest that the US-VISIT program appears to be 
providing tangible assistance for immigration officials. In Fiscal Year 
2007, US-VISIT identified 25,552 individuals applying for visas at 
consular offices and another 11,685 individuals at United States ports 
of entry who were on biometric watch lists.121 During that year, US-
VISIT also provided ICE with the names of 12,000 foreign travelers 
who had overstayed their allotted time in the United States, 273 of 
whom ICE ultimately detained.122 Furthermore, US-VISIT flagged 
and identified 11,246 individuals who entered the United States and 
subsequently committed a crime during their stays.123 A DHS official 
has indicated that at least two of the nineteen terrorist hijackers re-
sponsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks may have been stopped 
by the US-VISIT program and denied entry to the country.124 Overall, 
since the program’s inception in 2004, over 1,350 individuals with 
immigration violations and criminal records have been stopped from 
entering the United States.125 
2. Promoting Legitimate Travel and Trade 
While US-VISIT’s primary purpose is to promote security, DHS 
recognizes an equally important objective of promoting the speed and 
efficiency of legitimate travel and trade.126 Because biometric data is 
  
 120 Id. 
 121 Jessica Vaughan, Numbers from US-Visit, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 
(Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.cis.org/vaughan/USVISITNumbers (providing a sum-
mary of key figures from the annual report on US-VISIT for FY 2007). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Brazil to Fingerprint US Citizens, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2003, 8:14 
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3358627.stm; see also THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 564 n. 33 (“Two hijackers could have been 
denied admission at the port of entry based on violations of immigration rules govern-
ing terms of admission.”).  
 125 Miller, supra note 55, at 208 (footnote omitted). 
 126 BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1. 
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unique, US-VISIT can facilitate travel for those legitimate travelers 
who lose their passports or travel documentation.127 For instance, In-
terpol reports indicate that 6.7 million passports have been lost or sto-
len since 2001, 2.8 million of which were from the United States’ 
Visa Waiver Program countries.128 To this point, US-VISIT and its 
use of biometric data speeds the re-issuance of travel documentation 
for U.S. citizens, promoting efficiency in the event a traveler loses his 
or her passport.129 
Officials may also use US-VISIT to facilitate the visa issuance 
process. In 2000, more than 10 million foreign citizens applied for 
visas to enter the United States.130 Prior to US-VISIT, critics claimed 
that visa officers were too cautious and denied visas to too many ap-
plicants with legitimate travel reasons.131 State department officials 
had previously reviewed visa applications using NAILS, a name-
based database,132 but this proved problematic because travelers using 
a false name and fraudulent travel documentation could easily evade 
the system.133 Ultimately, tracking names with fingerprints and pass-
ports with biometric identifiers significantly reduced the need for ex-
tensive background checks for most visa applications.134 
US-VISIT is also taking proactive steps to reduce the burden it 
places on travelers entering the United States. In November of 2007, 
DHS began upgrading most fingerprint scanners used at United States 
points of entry from two-finger technology to ten-finger technolo-
gy.135 The upgrades were complete by December of 2008 and took 
place at all major points of entry.136 Initially, some critics worried that 
scanning more fingers would increase wait times and immigration 
  
 127 See NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 2 
(“By using biometrics to establish and verify travelers’ identities, we are making 
international travel more convenient, predictable and secure for legitimate visitors, 
but difficult, unpredictable and intimidating for criminals, immigration violators and 
those who want to do harm to the United States.”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Martin, supra note 18, at 331. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 332. 
 133 Id. See also discussion supra Part I.A. 
 134 Miller, supra note 55, at 207. 
 135 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: UPGRADE TO 10-FINGERPRINT 
COLLECTION 1 (2009), available 
athttp://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10-
fingerprint_collection_fact_sheet.pdf [hereinafter UPGRADE TO 10-FINGERPRINT 
COLLECTION].  
 136 Id. (noting that most foreign visitors entering the United States experience 
this new scanning technology). 
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lines, but DHS officials note that the new scanners actually decrease 
the time it takes to identify an individual.137 In fact, border checks are 
now estimated to take less than one minute to complete.138 This in-
crease in efficiency is due to the fact that the additional fingerprints 
provide more data to reference with the US-VISIT biometric database, 
allowing the system to find a match faster and with greater accura-
cy.139 This increase in accuracy should also substantially decrease the 
number of legitimate travelers who are mistakenly identified and tak-
en for questioning, allowing for a more efficient immigration pro-
cess.140 GAO recently reported that immigration officers at every U.S. 
point of entry surveyed agreed that US-VISIT improved their ability 
to identify and process travelers quickly.141 
To ensure that immigration procedures are easy and predictable 
for legitimate travelers, DHS has also engaged in an aggressive media 
campaign to educate visitors about the new biometric collection pro-
cedures.142 DHS has made presentations at over 500 events in 26 
countries around the world, created educational materials in 15 lan-
guages, and has worked with “government and private sector partners 
to ensure widespread reach to travelers around the world.”143 DHS 
notes that these efforts are designed to improve efficiency in travel 
and avoid confusion that may arise for foreign travelers.144 
3. Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Immigration System 
Prior to US-VISIT, the United States had difficulty regulating the 
free circulation of dangerous people after they entered the country.145 
For example, at least sixteen of the September 11th hijackers entered 
the United States legally with valid visas,146 but immigration officials 
did not track their activities once the terrorists entered the country.147 
  
 137 NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 1. 
 138 Miller, supra note 55, at 207. 
 139 NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 1. 
 140 Id. 
 141 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY: 
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT 
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 5 (2006). 
 142 See, e.g., NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 
92, at 1 (stating that “US-VISIT understands the critical role that communications 
play in avoiding confusion and clarifying misperception” regarding the collection of 
biometric data). 
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 145 See Martin, supra note 18, at 329-31. 
 146 Id. at 331. 
 147 Id. at 330 (“The U.S. does not track the movement of foreigners once they 
have entered.”). 
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Had immigration officials monitored the hijackers’ activities subse-
quent to their entry into the United States, officials would have dis-
covered that some were in violation of the terms of their visas. For 
instance, one hijacker was granted entry on a student visa, but never 
showed up to the University to which he was admitted.148 Beyond the 
events of 9/11, problems with the improper entry of foreigners into the 
United States are widespread. In 2000, there were an estimated 8.5 
million unauthorized foreigners in the United States.149 While most do 
not pose a security threat, this pervasive nature of illegal immigration 
hampers officials’ efforts to identify true security threats.150 Current 
mechanisms used by immigration officials to identify unauthorized 
entry or violations of visa terms are unable to correct the problem and 
thus, the need for a better system is apparent. 
Generally, visitors who violate their visa’s approved length of 
stay in the United States can be tracked using the exit-data collected 
from the Form I-94 that is returned to immigration officials when 
leaving the country.151 Unfortunately, compliance with collection pro-
tocols is spotty and many visitors exiting the United States through 
land border-crossings do not return their forms.152 This limits the ef-
fectiveness of the present tracking system that DHS can use to identi-
fy visa violators. Furthermore, I-94 forms are not very effective at 
tracking the departures of specific individuals because they are com-
pleted by hand, which means that U.S. immigration officials must 
enter the data into a computer manually, slowing the identification of 
violators.153 As noted by a senior immigration official in testimony 
given before the Senate Committee on Finance, the use of biometric 
data in entry-exit tracking systems would allow immigration officials 
to determine instantly whether a particular alien has overstayed his or 
her visa,154 which would be a considerable improvement over the cur-
rent system. 
  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 337. 
 150 Id. at 336-37 (noting, for example, that “[a]lthough...unauthorized workers 
do not themselves pose a security threat, tolerance of their entry and presence in the 
country hampers efforts to close the back door of illegal migration—a backdoor that 
terrorists can too easily exploit for their own purposes”).  
 151 Id. at 333. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See U.S. Borders: Safe or Sieve?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin. 
108th Cong. 120 (2003) (statement of Johnny N. Williams, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r for 
Field Operations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.); see also Martin, supra 
note 18, at 334. 
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4. Safeguarding Personal Privacy of Visitors 
Because the collection of biometric data involves highly personal 
information unique to an individual, there is the obvious concern that 
if not regulated, this information could be used or shared in an im-
proper way. DHS maintains that it only uses the biometric data for the 
purposes for which it was collected, and as authorized or mandated by 
law.155 To ensure that this goal is met, the US-VISIT program has 
created an officer position responsible for maintaining privacy and 
confidentiality.156 Further, in the event that a traveler believes that the 
information in US-VISIT’s database is incorrect, DHS provides mul-
tiple avenues for correcting the mistake.157 For example, foreign trav-
elers may make inquiries into their personal data or immigration-
related screening issues through the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
(“TRIP”).158 Individuals can initiate inquiries through an interactive 
website, by sending an email to US-VISIT’s Privacy Officer, or by 
mailing a hard-copy of all travel documentation to US-VISIT’s office 
at DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C.159 
There have been some recent concerns, however, about the integ-
rity of the privacy safeguards in place. In one such complaint filed 
under the Freedom of Information Act, a journalist sought information 
from CBP regarding the unexpected malfunction of US-VISIT com-
puters on August 18, 2005.160 According to a spokesperson for the 
DHS, a system shutdown occurred due to a virus that impacted com-
puter systems in New York, San Francisco, Miami, Los Angeles, 
Houston, Dallas, and Laredo, Texas.161 DHS later reported that US-
VISIT computers occasionally malfunction.162 
US-VISIT’s privacy policy has also been subject to criticism from 
foreign nationals. In another Freedom of Information Act complaint 
against DHS, a member of the European Union’s parliament was con-
  
 155 See ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra 
note 4, at 6 (explaining the US-VISIT’s privacy policy). 
 156 NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 3 
(noting that “US-VISIT has a dedicated privacy officer, who is responsible not only 
for ensuring compliance with privacy laws and procedures, but also for creating a 
culture within the program where privacy is inherently valued, treated as a fundamen-
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ment processes”). 
 157 Id. at 3-4. 
 158 Id. at 3. 
 159 Id. at 3-4. 
 160 Poulsen v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. C 06-1743 SI, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 73670, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006). 
 161 Id. at *2. 
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cerned with a notice published by DHS stating that it had instituted a 
program called the Automated Targeting System.163 This was a meth-
od of data-mining used by various databases—including US-VISIT—
to create risk assessments for travelers entering the United States.164 
The parliament member alleged that this treatment of passenger data 
was a violation of European Union citizens’ “fundamental rights.”165 
These allegations echoed domestic statements made by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), claiming that the U.S. terror watch 
lists that feed these systems are “bloated and full of inaccuracy” due 
to the ACLU’s inability to ascertain the criteria for adding or remov-
ing an individual from these lists.166 Going forward, DHS hopes to 
resolve these issues through its latest privacy initiatives, including its 
TRIP grievance process.167 
II. BIOMETRIC EXIT-DATA COLLECTION 
OPPORTUNITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO IMPROVE 
THE US-VISIT SECURITY INITIATIVE’S SUCCESS 
As previously discussed, US-VISIT’s true potential lies in obtain-
ing biometric data from those exiting the country. While operational 
realities and resource restrictions limit the ability of U.S. immigration 
officials to obtain this exit-data in the same manner as when foreign-
ers enter the country, creative approaches to data collection proce-
dures could allow for the collection of this information. First, sharing 
border-crossing infrastructure and staffing with Canada could dramat-
ically improve US-VISIT’s exit-data collection capabilities. Second, 
there are opportunities for foreign visitors’ biometric data to be col-
lected upon entry to Canada in accordance with DHS’s goal of push-
ing immigration procedures away from the United States’ physical 
border. Finally, US-VISIT could incorporate new forms of border 
enforcement identification technologies, such as RFID tagging and 
iris recognition software. 
  
 163 In ‘t Veld v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 589 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Jun Hongo, Will Entry Checks Cross the Line?, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2007),http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20071108f1.html (describing statements 
of Barry Steinhardt, director of the ACLU’s Program on Technology and Liberty). 
 167 See US-VISIT Redress Process (DHS TRIP), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1180020923182.shtm#2 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2011) (providing background information on the TRIP process). 
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A. Utilizing Canadian Border Infrastructure for Exit-Data Collection 
Executing a biometric exit-data collection procedure presents the 
most pressing need for US-VISIT’s success.168 While a complete in-
frastructure initiative at all border exits still remains unfeasible due to 
space constraints and considerable cost,169 US-VISIT officials could 
begin collecting data through immigration procedures already in place 
in Canada. There are already many examples of successful security 
cooperation between Canada and the United States.170 Thus, combin-
ing the infrastructure and staffing requirements at shared immigration 
checkpoints would allow for collection of biometric exit-data in the 
near future. 
Joint Canada-U.S. immigration activities are already in use at Ca-
nadian airports and can provide a model for border crossings. To facil-
itate this relationship, the Canadian government passed the Preclear-
ance Act in 1999171 and has authorized U.S. immigration officials to 
work at Canadian points of departure to the United States, inspecting 
foreign visitors who are bound for the United States.172 U.S. customs 
officials are currently posted in many of Canada’s airports and con-
duct pre-inspections for travelers flying to the United States.173 Fur-
ther, “[i]f a person flies into the United States from Japan via Van-
couver or Toronto, he or she will be greeted by [a] U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection inspector,” upon arrival in Canada.174 
Through future cooperation with Canadian immigration officials, 
CBP could implement biometric data collection kiosks at these Cana-
  
 168 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER 
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006). 
 169 See id. 
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Treaty Organization, and collaborated on the North American Air Defense system 
(commonly referred to as “NORAD”). Canada has also been incorporated into the 
United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative, providing ballistic missile defense. The 
two countries have created an export perimeter control, requiring sensitive technolo-
gies to remain within their common borders. Several law enforcement joint task forc-
es have also been established including Project North Star, Integrated Border En-
forcement Teams, and Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams. See, e.g. 
John Noble, Fortress America or Fortress North America?, 11 LAW & BUS. REV. 
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dian points of entry for those travelers continuing on to the United 
States. This approach would have two advantages. First, it would 
speed immigration processing times at the United States point of entry 
because biometric data for travelers connecting through Canada would 
already have been taken. Second, it would prevent travelers that the 
United States considers “dangerous people” from boarding a commer-
cial airliner bound for the United States, as well as prevent them from 
disembarking on U.S. soil. 
Cooperation at border crossings, however, has seen political op-
position stemming from the United States’ historical use of biometric 
identification technology. In 1999, U.S. immigration officials began 
reviewing commercial paperwork on the Canadian side of the Peace 
Bridge border crossing in Buffalo-Fort Erie for trucks bound for the 
United States.175 Customs officials intended to reduce congestion 
“caused by lack of advance document preparation.”176 In December 
2004, the United States and Canada announced an expanded Shared 
Border Management (“SBM”) pilot project at the Peace Bridge.177 As 
part of the program, DHS had planned to conduct all primary and sec-
ondary border operations on the Canadian side of the border.178 Con-
ducting inspections on the Canadian side made was advantageous 
because space to expand immigration and customs operations is great-
er on the Canadian side.179 A local neighborhood and a historic park 
constrain development on the U.S. side.180 
With the existing infrastructure present at border crossings, com-
mentators have suggested that collecting biometric exit-data at Cana-
dian points of entry represents the only feasible option.181 Because 
travelers exiting the United States must stop at the Canadian border to 
gain entry to Canada, collecting biometric exit-data in Canada would 
eliminate the need to build new infrastructure on the United States’ 
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side of the border and would ultimately reduce more traffic and con-
gestion outbound from the United States. Canadian immigration offi-
cials at many land borders already collect I-94 forms from travelers 
departing from the United States and return them to U.S. immigration 
officials for processing;182 thus, the foundation for cooperation be-
tween the two countries’ immigration officials is already established. 
In April 2007, however, both Canada and the United States with-
drew from negotiations necessary to finalize the SBM program.183 The 
two countries could not agree on fundamental concerns regarding 
arrest authority and the right of U.S. officers to fingerprint travelers 
who come to the bridge, but decide not to cross.184 While U.S. Con-
gressional leaders continue to call upon President Obama to renew 
negotiations with Canadian counterparts,185 commentators do not see 
a resolution to this impasse in the near future.186 
Specifically, Canadian negotiators argued that collecting bio-
metric data in Canadian territory would violate Canada’s Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).187 Section 15(1) of the Charter pro-
vides that: “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law with-
out discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on 
race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”188 Commentators and Canadian negotiators anal-
ogized their fears that the SBM program would violate the Charter 
with those of human rights groups that criticized NSEERS.189 These 
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groups argued that NSEERS’s implementation in Canadian airports 
under the Preclearance Act violated the Charter because it targeted 
travelers from primarily Muslim and Arabic countries.190 
Canada intended the Preclearance Act to “avoid the extra-
territorial application of US laws at these preclearance sites” and pro-
vided all travelers the full protections of Canadian law and the Char-
ter.191 If SBM is to maintain similar protections, the United States 
must guarantee that similar targeting does not occur in the future. This 
objective is met under the current US-VISIT program because its 
scope now includes all non-U.S. citizen travelers, regardless of coun-
try.192 Thus, unlike under the NSEERS protocol, there is neither a 
need nor a possibility for U.S. or Canadian customs officials to profile 
travelers based upon their affiliation with any religion or ethnic group. 
With the ability to identify the biometric identity of all travelers, con-
cerns over Charter violations could be mitigated. US-VISIT’s breadth 
and demonstrated effectiveness could lead to productive SBM negoti-
ations in the future, providing a feasible avenue for the collection of 
biometric exit-data.  
B. Extending the Reach of U.S. Border Protection by Creating a 
Common Biometric Data Collection Perimeter 
Called the “longest, unprotected border,” the Canada-U.S. border 
stretches 5,525 miles and has 84 land border crossings.193 In 2000, 
figures indicated that approximately 130 million people cross the 
Canada-U.S. border each year and goods in excess of $1.5 billion 
cross the border each day.194 Canada exports about 82 percent of its 
goods to the United States, and the United States sends roughly 19 
percent of its goods to Canada.195 Additionally, Canada is the biggest 
export market for thirty-nine U.S. states.196 
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Many Canadian officials and northern U.S. border states opposed 
the implementation of US-VISIT because they were concerned about 
the program’s potential impact on trade and tourism.197 Policies that 
increase border-crossing times would be severely detrimental to 
commercial interests of both countries.198 For instance, many corpora-
tions rely upon Just-In-Time (“JIT”) deliveries from across the border 
and delays could result in lost revenue and manufacturing shut-
downs.199 Unsurprisingly, both nations recognize that overzealous 
border restrictions could devastate their respective economies,200 and 
that implementing US-VISIT exit-data collection procedures at the 
land border crossings would have at least a noticeable impact on the 
trans-border flow.201 GAO has also noted that US-VISIT exit-
capabilities cannot be implemented at border crossings without “in-
curring a major impact” on those facilities.202 
National security concerns further complicate the problem be-
cause, as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) notes, 
“[w]ith the possible exception of the United States, there are more 
international terrorist organizations active in Canada than anywhere in 
the world.”203 According to CSIS, this is due to Canada’s proximity to 
the United States—the principal target of international terrorist organ-
izations—and Canada’s accommodating immigration policies.204 Be-
cause of the prevalence of terrorist organizations in both the United 
States and Canada, an agreement over how to handle biometric data 
collection necessarily implicates important political policies. 
While some commentators have underscored this tension between 
national security concerns and economic development, others have 
argued that U.S. national security depends upon maintaining open 
economic corridors; specifically, maintaining the economic relation-
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ship it has with Canada.205 Accordingly, as one commentator noted: 
“U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access 
to North American and global networks of transport, energy, infor-
mation, finance and labor. It is self-defeating for the United States to 
embrace security measures that end up isolating it from those net-
works.”206 Indeed, terrorists have repeatedly attacked United States 
economic targets in an attempt to undermine its security.207 Thus, 
maintaining a permeable border with Canada may have corresponding 
benefits for the security interests of the United States.208 
Taking into consideration the importance of border fluidity, the 
United States adopts the view that its borders must represent its last 
line of defense in that security “efforts must begin beyond U.S. terri-
torial limits.”209 Thus, many national security policy proposals are 
based upon an attempt to “push U.S. borders out.”210 One policy pro-
posal that has recently gained momentum involves the implementation 
of a “North American Perimeter” (“Perimeter”).211 Under a Perimeter 
regime, “internal border controls are lifted as a common external bor-
der is established.”212 Advocates for the policy argue that: 
[h]armonizing US and Canadian immigration and asylum pol-
icies would make it harder to organize attacks on the U.S. 
from Canada, and vice versa. If the two countries agreed on 
the criteria and used the same procedures for admitting for-
eign nationals, they could leave the Canada-U.S. border large-
ly unguarded, benefiting trade and tourism.213 
The European Union has implemented a similar system, where 13 
member nations participate in the collection of entry and exit-data, but 
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permit the free movement of people between the countries.214 Execut-
ed by the Schengen Agreement, members share access to a collective 
integrated border security database and present a common border 
check for foreign travelers.215 The fluidity of goods and people across 
European borders has been associated with notable economic growth 
in the region.216 
Critics of the proposal argue that Perimeter would usurp Canada’s 
ability to set its own immigration policies, requiring it to harmonize 
its security and immigration policies with that of the United States.217 
From a national security standpoint, critics point out that there are 
noticeable differences between Canadian and U.S. immigration poli-
cies that make coordination difficult. Indeed, several potential terror-
ists have been intercepted at the Canada-U.S. border,218 which has led 
to the perception that Canada’s immigration policies are more lenient 
than those of the United States.219 
Adopting biometric data collection practices in Canada, however, 
would not necessitate a full implementation of a Perimeter; the parties 
could reach this result with a narrow agreement. A shared biometric 
data collection system could be set up independently and would not 
require the harmonization of visa and asylum policies, allaying Cana-
dian concerns of losing control over its immigration policies. Addi-
tionally, a physical barrier between the United States and Canada 
would still exist for those concerned about opening the border to 
completely unrestricted travel. 
Under this policy initiative, the need to confirm a traveler’s identi-
ty at the Canada-U.S. border would be eliminated. Travelers who en-
ter the United States over the Canada-U.S. border would have already 
had their identity confirmed upon entering Canada. Determining the 
true identity of travelling Canadians would also not be necessary be-
cause under the current US-VISIT regime, Canadians are exempt from 
biometric data collection protocols.220 Thus, biometric data collection 
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at Canada-U.S. border checkpoints would not be necessary, facilitat-
ing the flow of legitimate travel. Such a program would allow the 
United States to uphold the objectives set forth by US-VISIT, but con-
tinue to provide a relatively open border with Canada. Similar to the 
proposed SBM approach, US-VISIT’s scope includes all foreign trav-
elers, not just those from targeted countries. Thus, Canadian concerns 
over potential Charter violations through profiling could be eliminat-
ed. 
C. Implementing Alternative Exit-Data Collection Technologies 
1. RFID Tagging in I-94 Forms 
While building exit-data collection facilities identical to those 
found upon points of entry would be cost-prohibitive, several emerg-
ing identification technologies exist that could be used to similar ef-
fect. For example, Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) technol-
ogy has been tested at several land border crossings since 2006.221 
RFID technology comprises a microchip with an antenna that trans-
mits a unique signal wirelessly to a receiver that reads the signal.222 
Beyond the border security context, other industries have utilized 
RFID technology as part of their business strategy. For instance, credit 
card companies have begun to embed RFID chips in their cards and 
have marketed this “PayPass” technology as an ability for consumers 
to swipe cards wirelessly.223 Retailers are also using RFID chips to 
track goods for supply-chain management purposes.224 
Chips embedded in I-94 forms can transmit data to radio receivers 
located at border exit points.225 RFID chips can transmit to receivers 
20 feet away,226 allowing officials to capture the information instanta-
neously when travelers cross the border without requiring automobile 
or pedestrian traffic to stop at the border. This technology would al-
low U.S. border officials to track electronically those travelers carry-
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ing their I-94 Forms when leaving the United States.227 Such an im-
plementation would be similar to the electronic highway toll EZ-Pass 
system, where RFID transmitters track individual vehicles as they 
pass through tolls without stopping.228 
However, performance and reliability problems suggest that this 
approach is not a feasible long-term solution. Furthermore, the data 
embedded in the forms is not biometric and does not fulfill DHS’s 
mandate to implement a biometric entry-exit tracking system.229 In-
deed, the tracking system would not be able to track the exit of those 
individuals who do not carry their I-94 forms when leaving the coun-
try or those individuals who carry another’s I-94 form for the purpose 
of deceiving the exit-data collection system. Thus, it is only a tempo-
rary solution.230 
2. Iris Recognition Technology 
While not currently implemented, DHS has expressed interest in 
expanding the biometric data collection procedures to include iris 
recognition technology.231 The technology scans the distinct charac-
teristics of an individual’s iris—the colored ring surrounding the pu-
pil.232 Other countries have already implemented iris recognition at 
immigration checkpoints. For instance, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and the Netherlands each allow frequent travelers to enroll in pro-
grams that register the individual’s iris pattern in order to expedite the 
immigration process.233 Singapore uses iris recognition to identify and 
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admit approximately 50,000 workers that travel from Malaysia each 
day.234 Since 2001, the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) has imple-
mented a mandatory iris scan for every foreigner entering the coun-
try.235 
Recent developments in iris scanning technology suggest that it 
would be an effective alternative to fingerprint scans. Previous gen-
erations of iris recognition technology required individuals to stand 
three to ten inches from the scanner.236 However, newer-generation 
scanners can recognize the iris of an individual standing fifteen meters 
away.237 Furthermore, the time required to match an iris pattern within 
a database is minimal using current technology. UAE officials report 
that iris recognition searches typically take about one second.238 
With these recent advances in iris scanning technology, the Unit-
ed States could require individuals leaving the country to look at a 
scanner by the side of the road. Such an installation would not require 
the heavy investment in infrastructure and personnel necessary to 
support an exit-data collection procedure mimicking that specified for 
entry. Furthermore, travelers would not need to stop and be processed 
individually by immigration officials.  
Even if US-VISIT officials utilize iris scanning technology at 
borders, they should not discontinue the use of all fingerprinting 
throughout the program. The iris scan could take place simultaneously 
with the fingerprint scan or during the facial photograph when the 
foreigner is entering the country. Therefore, US-VISIT would still be 
able to harness the power of the FBI’s fingerprint database, but be 
able to use iris data to record the exit of those individuals later. Using 
multiple forms of biometric identification may be a feasible way to 
track both the entry and exit of foreign visitors. 
CONCLUSION 
While DHS asserts that the US-VISIT program has experienced 
reasonable success in meeting its objectives, there still exist areas for 
improvement in its biometric collection procedures. The difficulties in 
collecting biometric exit-data for travelers leaving the United States 
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remains one of the primary gaps DHS must resolve in order to comply 
with its mandate for a biometric tracking system. Cooperation with 
Canadian border officials under the proposed SBM scheme could al-
leviate the infrastructure requirements at border crossings that prevent 
DHS from implementing exit-data collection. In future SBM negotia-
tions, US-VISIT’s expanded scope can resolve Canadian fears of 
Charter violations that allegedly occurred under the NSEERS pro-
gram. Alternatively, the two countries could implement a policy ini-
tiative that would resemble a common biometric identification pe-
rimeter. Such a program would promote reduced transaction costs for 
businesses at border crossings, while maintaining the security objec-
tives set forth by US-VISIT. If Canada and the United States are un-
willing to collaborate, US-VISIT could deploy alternative biometric 
collection technologies such as iris recognition, which may make the 
collection of exit-data information more feasible. 
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